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DECISION MAKING VIA GENERALIZED BAJRAKTAREVIĆ MEANS
ZSOLT PÁLES AND PAWEŁ PASTECZKA
Abstract. We define decision-making functions which arise from studying the multi-
dimensional generalization of the weighted Bajraktarević means. It allows a nonlinear
approach to optimization problems.
These functions admit several interesting (from the point of view of decision-making)
properties, for example, delegativity (which states that each subgroup of decision-makers
can aggregate their decisions and efforts), casuativity (each decision affects the final
outcome except two trivial cases) and convexity-type properties.
Beyond establishing the most important properties of such means, we solve their
equality problem, we introduce a notion of synergy and characterize the null-synergy
decision-making functions of this type.
1. Introduction
In game theory the mathematical models for decision-making create challenging and
important problems binding computer science, economy, mathematics and psychology.
In one of such models there is a set D of all possible decisions and a finite number n of
players (decision makers) with their individual nonnegative weights (efforts) and decisions.
Obviously, the sum of all weights cannot be zero and thus (as a vector) it belongs to the
set
Wn := [0,+∞)
n \ {(0, . . . , 0)}.
The issue is to aggregate all the individual decisions with the corresponding weights to
one (common) decision. For this purpose, we need the notion of an aggregation function
on D, which is defined to be a map
M : W(D)→ D, where W(D) :=
∞⋃
n=1
Dn ×Wn.
For instance, when the set D of decisions is a convex subset of a linear space X, then
the weighted arithmetic mean A, which is defined as
A(x, λ) :=
λ1x1 + · · ·+ λnxn
λ1 + · · ·+ λn
(x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D
n, λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Wn),
is a well-known aggregation function. Further examples for an aggregation function are
as follows (see for example [11]):
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(1) The Primacy Effect DPE : W(D)→ D is defined by
DPE(x, λ) :=
{
xi
∣∣ λi 6= 0 and λj = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}.
(2) The Recency Effect DRE : W(D)→ D is defined by
DRE(x, λ) :=
{
xi
∣∣ λi 6= 0 and λj = 0 for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}}.
(3) The First Dominating Decision DFDD : W(D)→ D is given by
DFDD(x, λ) :=
{
xi
∣∣ λi = max(λ) and λj < λi for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}}.
(4) The First Dominant DFD : W(D)→ D is given by
DFD(x, λ) := DFDD(x, λ
∗), where λ∗i :=
∑
j : xj=xi
λj.
All functions listed in (1)–(4) are reflexive, eliminative, nullhomogeneous in the weights
but not symmetric (see the relevant definitions below). Furthermore, they are all con-
servative (or selective), which means that the aggregated decision is always one of the
individual ones. For a detailed study of (nonweighted) conservative aggregation functions,
we refer the reader to the recent study by Couceiro–Devillet–Marichal [4] and Devillet–
Kiss–Marichal [9].
In many settings, D is an infinite set which often refers to the position of the players
in a space before the game. An aggregation function unites the positions of all the
players into one. An individual nonnegative weight measures the impact of the decision
of the corresponding players to the final outcome. In order to introduce plausible and
natural properties for aggregation functions, we introduce the concept of decision-making
functions on an arbitrary set D. For this aim, we adopt the notion of weighted means
(which were defined on an interval) from the paper [16] to our more general setting. An
aggregation function M : W(D) → D is called a decision-making function (on D) if it
satisfies the following five conditions:
(i) M is reflexive: For all x ∈ D and λ ∈ R+, we have M(x, λ) = x.
(ii) M is nullhomogeneous in the weights: For all n ∈ N, (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D
n, (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈
Wn, and t ∈ R+, we have
M
(
(x1, . . . , xn), (tλ1, . . . , tλn)
)
= M
(
(x1, . . . , xn), (λ1, . . . , λn)
)
.
(iii) M is symmetric: For all n ∈ N, (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D
n, (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Wn and for all
permutations σ of {1, . . . , n}, we have
M
(
(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)), (λσ(1), . . . , λσ(n))
)
= M
(
(x1, . . . , xn), (λ1, . . . , λn)
)
.
(iv) M is eliminative or neglective: For all n ≥ 2, (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D
n and (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈
Wn with λ1 = 0, we have
M
(
(x1, . . . , xn), (λ1, . . . , λn)
)
= M
(
(x2, . . . , xn), (λ2, . . . , λn)
)
.
(v) M is reductive: For all n ≥ 2, (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D
n with x1 = x2 and (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Wn,
we have
M
(
(x1, . . . , xn), (λ1, . . . , λn)
)
= M
(
(x2, x3, . . . , xn), (λ1 + λ2, λ3, . . . , λn)
)
.
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We also introduce the concept of the effort function, which is aiming to aggregate the
individual weights (efforts) into one positive number: A function E : W(D)→ R+ is called
an effort function (on D) if it satisfies the following five conditions:
(i) E is reflexive in the weights: For all x ∈ D and λ ∈ R+, we have E(x, λ) = λ.
(ii) E is homogeneous in the weights: For all n ∈ N, (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D
n, (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Wn,
and t ∈ R+, we have
E
(
(x1, . . . , xn), (tλ1, . . . , tλn)
)
= tE
(
(x1, . . . , xn), (λ1, . . . , λn)
)
.
(iii) E is symmetric.
(iv) E is eliminative or neglective.
(v) E is reductive.
One can easily see that the map α : W(D)→ R+ given by
α(x, λ) := λ1 + · · ·+ λn (x ∈ D
n, λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Wn),
is an effort function, which we call the arithmetic effort function.
The symmetry property of decision-making and effort functions means that there is no
distinction between players and also their order is irrelevant for the decision. This property
has a far-reaching consequences especially for conservative functions, as it determines the
anty-symmetric preference relation on D by x ≻ y :⇐⇒ x = M((x, y), (1, 1)) (cf. [8]
for details). It was proved experimentally that this relation cannot be generalized to
multivariable choice; this phenomena is known as a decoy effect (see for example Huber–
Payne–Puto [12]).
The nullhomogeneity of M and the homogeneity of E in the weights states that if the
weights are scaled by the same factor, then the decision remains unchanged and the effort
is scaled by the same factor. The meaning of the elimination principle is that players
with zero weight do not affect the decision and the effort. One can easily check that the
arithmetic mean is a decision-making function over any convex subset of a linear space.
We introduce now an aggregation-type property which will play a significant role in
the sequel. We say that a decision-making function M on D is delegative (admits the
delegation principle or partial aggregation principle) if, for all (y, µ) ∈W(D), there exists
a pair (y0, µ0) ∈ D × R+ such that
(1.1) M((x, y), (λ, µ)) = M((x, y0), (λ, µ0)) ((x, λ) ∈W(D)).
Analogously, we can speak about the delgativity of an effort function E on D which means
that, for all (y, µ) ∈W(D), there exists a pair (y0, µ0) ∈ D × R+ such that
(1.2) E((x, y), (λ, µ)) = E((x, y0), (λ, µ0)) ((x, λ) ∈W(D)).
Lemma 1.1. Let (y, µ) ∈ W(D) be fixed. If M : W(D) → D is a delegative decision-
making function, then (1.1) holds if and only if y0 = M(y, µ). Analogously, if E : W(D)→
R+ is a delegative effort function, then (1.2) holds if and only if µ0 = E(y, µ).
Proof. Using the properties of decision making functions and applying the delegativity of
M for (x, λ) = (y, µ) twice, we get
M(y, µ) = M((y, y), (µ, µ)) = M((y, y0), (µ, µ0)) = M((y0, y0), (µ0, µ0)) = y0.
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Similarly, the properties of effort functions and applying the delegativity of E yield
E(y, µ) =
1
2
E((y, y), (µ, µ)) =
1
2
E((y, y0), (µ, µ0)) =
1
2
E((y0, y0), (µ0, µ0)) = µ0,
which completes the proof of the lemma. 
Motivated by the above statement, a delegative decision-making function M and a
delegative effort function E are called associated if, for all (y, µ) ∈ W(D), the equalities
(1.1) and (1.2) hold with (y0, µ0) = (M(y, µ),E(y, µ)).
The aim of this paper is to present a construction of a broad class of decision-making
and effort functions which arise from studying so-called weighted Bajraktarević means.
Despite of the analytical background of this paper, we are convinced that our construction
could provide useful models for game theoretical and for decision-making problems.
Our motivation is to present a mean-type approach to studying the Farm Structure
Optimization Problem – cf. for example Abd El-Wahed–Abo-Sinna [1], Czyżak [5],
Słowiński–Teghem [18], Tzeng–Huang [19], Xu–Zhou [20].
2. Observability and conical convexity
A subset S of a linear space X over R is called a ray if S = Rx := R+x := {λx | λ ∈ R+}
holds for some nonzero element x ∈ X. If y ∈ Rx, then the unique positive numbers λ
for which y = λx holds will be denoted by [y : x].
A set S is called a cone if it is the union of rays of X. One can see that S is a cone
precisely if it is closed under multiplication by positive scalars. The cone generated by
the set S – denoted by cone(S) – is the smallest cone containing S. It is clear that
cone(S) = R+S =
⋃
x∈S Rx.
A subset S of X over R is called observable (from the origin) if the rays generated by
two distinct elements of S are disjoint. Note that for an observable subset S, every ray
contained in cone(S) intersects S at exactly one point. Moreover, the family {Rx | x ∈ S}
is a partition of cone(S). Due to this fact, for every observable set S one can define the
projection along rays (briefly the ray projection) πS : cone(S) → S as follows: For every
x ∈ S and y ∈ Rx, we have πS(y) = x. As a matter of fact, observability of S is not only
sufficient but also necessary to define such map.
We say that a function f : D → X is observable if it is injective and has an observable
image. Analogously to the previous setup, we define πf := πf(D). The extended inverse
of f , denoted by f (−1) : cone(f(D))→ D is defined by
f (−1) := f−1 ◦ πf .
Clearly, f (−1)(x) = f−1(x) if x ∈ f(D).
We say that a subset S of X is conically convex if cone(S) is a convex set and convex
hull of S does not contain the origin. Note that conical convexity is a weaker property
than convexity: every convex set which does not contain zero is conically convex, the
converse implication is not true.
Hereafter an observable function f : D → X such that f(D) is conically convex is called
admissible.
In the next result we give a characterization of admissibility for functions with 2-
dimensional range.
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Theorem 2.1. Let f = (f1, f2) : I → R2 be continuous. Then f is admissible if and only
if, for all distinct elements x, y ∈ I, f(x) and f(y) are linearly independent, that is,
(2.1)
∣∣∣∣f1(x) f1(y)f2(x) f2(y)
∣∣∣∣ 6= 0.
Proof. Assume first that f is admissible but (2.1) is not valid for some x, y ∈ I with
x 6= y. Then the two vectors f(x) and f(y) are linearly dependent. Thus, there exist
(α, β) 6= (0, 0) such that αf(x) + βf(y) = 0. Because (0, 0) is not contained in f(I), we
have that f(x) 6= (0, 0) 6= f(y), hence αβ 6= 0. In the case when αβ < 0, we get that
the rays generated by f(x) and f(y) are the same, which contradicts the observability.
If αβ > 0, then (0, 0) is in the segment connecting [f(x), f(y)], which contradicts the
property that the convex hull of f(I) does not contain the origin.
Assume now that (2.1) holds for all (x, y) ∈ ∆(I) := {(x, y) | x, y ∈ I, x < y}. This
immediately shows that f(I) is observable.
Since ∆(I) is a convex set and f is continuous, therefore the determinant is either
positive on ∆(I) or negative on ∆(I). We may assume that it is positive everywhere
on ∆(I). Then the pair (f1, f2) is a so-called Chebyshev system on I. According to [3,
Theorem 2], there exist two real constants α and β such that αf1 + βf2 is positive over
the interior of I and thus it is nonnegative over I. This implies that the curve f(I) is
contained in the closed half plain P = {(u, v) ∈ R2 | αu + βv ≥ 0}. Consider now the
unit circle and project the curve f(I) into it. Then, by the continuity of the projection
mapping, the projection of the curve is an arc of the unit circle which is contained in P .
It is obvious that the conical hull of the curve f(I) and the conical hull of the arc are
identical. On the other hand, the property that the arc is contained in the half plain P ,
implies that its conical hull is convex. This shows the conical hull of f(I) is also convex.
The origin cannot be contained in the conical hull of f(I) because then there were two
distinct points of f(I) belonging to the boundary line {(u, v) ∈ R2 | αu + βv = 0} such
that the origin were in the segment connecting them. This contradicts the property that
every two distinct points of f(I) are linearly independent. 
3. Generalized Bajraktarević means and their properties
Given an admissible function f : D → X, we can define the (weighted) generalized
Bajraktarević mean Bf : W(D)→ D by
Bf(x, λ) = f
(−1)
( n∑
k=1
λkf(xk)
)
,
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D
n are the entries and λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Wn are the corre-
sponding weights. We also define βf : W(D)→ R+ by
βf(x, λ) :=
[ n∑
k=1
λkf(xk) : f(Bf(x, λ))
]
,
which we call the effort function associated to Bf .
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IntuitivelyD is the space of all possible decisions, x is a vector of all considered decisions,
and λ is the effort of players invested in the option. In this way Bf(x, λ) is the decision
derived from the possible decisions and their weights.
Lemma 3.1. Let f : D → X be an admissible function. Then, for all n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈
Dn ×Wn, there exists exactly one pair (u, η) ∈ D × R+ satisfying
(3.1) ηf(u) =
n∑
k=1
λkf(xk).
Furthermore, u = Bf (x, λ) and η = βf(x, λ).
Proof. As f(D) is conically convex, we know that∑n
k=1 λkf(xk)∑n
k=1 λk
∈ cone f(D).
Thus there exists η ∈ R+ such that
η−1
n∑
k=1
λkf(xk) ∈ f(D).
Moreover, as f(D) is observable, the constant η is uniquely determined by x and λ. Now,
as f is injective, there exists exactly one u ∈ D such that
η−1
n∑
k=1
λkf(xk) = f(u),
which is trivially equivalent to (3.1). The last assertion simply follows from the definition
of Bf(x, λ) and βf (x, λ). 
Now Bf is the equivalent (or aggregated) decision, βf is the equivalent (or aggregated)
effort. In fact βf , can be considered as the amount of goods we need to invest into a single
decision to be irrelevant between the diversed an the aggregated situation. This property
is much more transparent in view of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 3.2. Let f : D → X be an admissible function. Then Bf is a decision-making
function and βf is an effort function on D.
Proof. Fix n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈ Dn×Wn. In view of Lemma 3.1 both Bf(x, λ) and βf (x, λ)
depends on its arguments implicitly via the sum
∑n
k=1 λkf(xk). This immediately implies
that Bf and βf are both symmetric, reductive and eliminative. The nullhomogeneity of
Bf is obvious in view of the definition of f
(−1) = f−1 ◦ πf . The reflexivity properties of
Bf and βf are immediate consequences of the equalities
Bf(y, λ) = f
(−1)(λf(y)) = f−1 ◦ f(y) = y,
βf (y, λ) = [λf(y) : f(Bf(y, λ))] = [λf(y) : f(y)] = λ (y ∈ D, λ ∈ R+).
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Now we only need to verify the homogeneity of βf in the weights. To this end, take
additionally t ∈ R+. By the definition of βf and the nullhomogeneity of Bf , we have
βf(x, tλ) =
[ n∑
k=1
tλkf(xk) : f(Bf(x, tλ))
]
= t
[ n∑
k=1
λkf(xk) : f(Bf(x, λ))
]
= tβf(x, λ),
which completes the proof. 
Theorem 3.3. Let f1, f2 : I → R be continuous functions such that f2 is nowhere zero
and f1/f2 is strictly monotone. Then f = (f1, f2) is admissible and we have the equalities
Bf(x, λ) =
(f1
f2
)−1(λ1f1(x1) + · · ·+ λnf1(xn)
λ1f2(x1) + · · ·+ λnf2(xn)
)
((x, λ) ∈ In ×Wn),(3.2)
βf(x, λ) =
λ1f2(x1) + · · ·+ λnf2(xn)
f2(Bf(x, λ))
((x, λ) ∈ In ×Wn).(3.3)
Proof. First we show that f = (f1, f2) is admissible. In view of Theorem 2.1, it is sufficient
to show that (2.1) holds for all distinct elements x, y of I. Indeed,∣∣∣∣f1(x) f1(y)f2(x) f2(y)
∣∣∣∣ = f1(x)f2(y)− f1(y)f2(x) = f2(x)f2(y)
(
f1(x)
f2(x)
−
f1(y)
f2(y)
)
,
which is nonzero by our assumptions.
To prove the identity (3.2), let n ∈ N and a pair (x, λ) ∈ In × Wn be fixed. As
f(Bf(x, λ)) and
∑n
i=1 λif(xi) are on the same ray, we have
f1(Bf(x, λ))
f2(Bf(x, λ))
=
λ1f1(x1) + · · ·+ λnf1(xn)
λ1f2(x1) + · · ·+ λnf2(xn)
.
Using that f1/f2 is invertible and applying its inverse side-by-side, we obtain the desired
equality (3.2). The equality
βf (x, λ) =
[ n∑
k=1
λkf(xk) : f(Bf(x, λ))
]
=
[ n∑
k=1
λkf2(xk) : f2(Bf (x, λ))
]
implies (3.3) immediately. 
A classical particular case of the above theorem is when f1 and f2 are power functions
on I = R+: f1(x) = x
p and f2(x) = x
q, where p, q ∈ R with p 6= q. Then
(3.4)
Bf(x, λ) = Gp,q(x, λ) :=
(
λ1x
p
1 + · · ·+ λnx
p
n
λ1x
q
1 + · · ·+ λnx
q
n
) 1
p−q
,
βf (x, λ) = γp,q(x, λ) :=
(λ1x
q
1 + · · ·+ λnx
q
n)
p
p−q
(λ1x
p
1 + · · ·+ λnx
p
n)
q
p−q
,
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which are called the Gini mean and the Gini effort function of parameter (p, q) where
p 6= q (cf. [10]). For the case p = q, let f1(x) := x
p ln(x) and f2(x) := x
p. Then we have
Bf (x, λ) = Gp,p(x, λ) := exp
(
λ1x
p
1 ln x1 + · · ·+ λnx
p
n ln xp
λ1x
p
1 + · · ·+ λnx
p
n
)
,
βf (x, λ) = γp,p(x, λ) := (λ1x
p
1 + · · ·+ λnx
p
n) exp
(
(−p) ·
λ1x
p
1 ln x1 + · · ·+ λnx
p
n ln xp
λ1x
p
1 + · · ·+ λnx
p
n
)
,
4. Aggregation-type properties
4.1. Delegativity. In this subsection we establish the delegativity of the generalized
Bajraktarević means and the corresponding effort functions, moreover, we show that
these two maps are associated to each other.
Theorem 4.1. Let f : D → X be an admissible function. Then both Bf and βf are
delegative and associated.
Proof. Fix m ∈ N and (y, µ) ∈ Dm ×Wm. For an arbitrary (x, λ) ∈ D
n ×Wn, according
to the Lemma 3.1, we have
βf ((x, y), (λ, µ))f(Bf((x, y), (λ, µ))) =
n∑
k=1
λkf(xk) +
m∑
j=1
µjf(yj),
βf (y, µ)f(Bf(y, µ)) =
m∑
j=1
µjf(yj).
Then, these equalites and Lemma 3.1 imply
βf((x, y), (λ, µ))f(Bf((x, y), (λ, µ))) =
n∑
k=1
λkf(xk) + βf(y, µ)f(Bf(y, µ))
= βf((x, y0), (λ, µ0))f(Bf((x, y0), (λ, µ0))),
which then yields (1.1). 
The following result could be derived from the above theorem, but we shall provide a
direct and short proof for it.
Corollary 4.2. Let f : D → X be an admissible function. Let n,m ∈ N, x ∈ Dn and
λ(1), . . . , λ(m) ∈ Wn. Denote yj := Bf(x, λ
(j)) and µj := βf (x, λ
(j)) for j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Then, for all (t1, . . . , tm) ∈ Wm,
(4.1)
Bf (x, t1λ
(1) + · · ·+ tmλ
(m)) = Bf (y, (t1µ1, . . . , tmµm)),
βf (x, t1λ
(1) + · · ·+ tmλ
(m)) = βf (y, (t1µ1, . . . , tmµm)).
Proof. By the definitions of y1, . . . , ym and µ1, . . . , µm, according to Lemma 3.1, we have
µjf(yj) = βf (x, λ
(j))f(Bf(x, λ
(j))) =
n∑
i=1
λ
(j)
i f(xi) (j ∈ {1, . . . , m}).
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Multiplying this equality by tj side by side, and then summing up the equalities so ob-
tained for j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we get
βf (y, (t1µ1, . . . , tmµm))f(Bf(y, (t1µ1, . . . , tmµm)))
=
m∑
j=1
tjµjf(yj) =
m∑
j=1
tj
( n∑
i=1
λ
(j)
i f(xi)
)
=
n∑
i=1
( m∑
j=1
tjλ
(j)
i
)
f(xi)
= βf (x, t1λ
(1) + · · ·+ tmλ
(m))f(Bf(x, t1λ
(1) + · · ·+ tmλ
(m))).
The above equality, by the observability of f , yields (4.1). 
The latter corollary can be also rewritten in the matrix form.
Corollary 4.3. Let f : D → X be an admissible function. Let x ∈ Dn, and Λ =
(λ(1), . . . , λ(m)) ∈ Wmn . Define a vector y :=
(
Bf (x, λ
(i))
)m
i=1
∈ Dm and µ :=
(
βf(x, λ
(i))
)m
i=1
∈
R
m
+ . Then, for all t ∈ Wm,
(4.2) Bf(x,Λt) = Bf(y, µ·t) and βf (x,Λt) = βf(y, µ·t),
where “·” stands for the coordinate-wise multiplication of the elements of Wm.
4.2. Casuativity. We say that a decision making function M on D is casuative if for all
(x, λ) ∈W(D) and for all pair (y, µ) ∈ D × (0,+∞), we have
(4.3) M(x, λ) = M
(
(x, y), (λ, µ)
)
⇐⇒ y = M(x, λ).
Casuativity is somehow opposite to conservativity. Namely there holds the following
easy-to-see lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Let M be a symmetric and casuative decision-making function on D. Then
for all distinct x1, x2 ∈ D and λ1, λ2 ∈ (0,+∞) we have M((x1, x2), (λ1, λ2)) ∈ D \
{x1, x2}.
It is also reasonable to define weak casuativity in the case when the (⇐) implication of
(4.3) holds. Observe that there are number of weakly casuative decision making functions
which are not casuative, for example decision making functions which are induced by a
preference relation.
Proposition 4.5. Generalized Bajraktarević mean Bf is casuative for every admissible
function f : D → X.
Proof. As Bf is delegative it is sufficient to show that (4.3) holds for all (x, λ) ∈ D×R+.
The (⇐) part is then trivial. To prove the converse implication let x, y ∈ D and λ, µ ∈
(0,+∞) such that
Bf
(
(x, y), (λ, µ)
)
= Bf(x, λ) = x.
Thus, by Lemma 3.1, there exists η ∈ R+ such that λf(x)+µf(y) = ηf(x). Consequently,
as µ 6= 0 we get f(y) = η−λ
µ
f(x). Now admissibility of f implies 0 /∈ conv f(X) and
therefore η−λ
µ
> 0. Then observability of f yields y = x. 
This property plays an important role in the definition of effort function.
Corollary 4.6. Let f : D → X and g : D → Y be two admissible function such that
Bf = Bg. Then βf = βg.
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Proof. Let (x, λ) ∈W(D), set m := Bf(x, λ) = Bg(x, λ) and assume that d := βg(x, λ)−
βf(x, λ) 6= 0. Without loss of generality, we may assume that d > 0.
Take y0 ∈ D \ {m} arbitrarily. By Theorem 4.1 and the equality Bf = Bg we have
Bf((m, y0), (βf(x, λ), 1)) = Bf((x, y0), (λ, 1)) = Bg((x, y0), (λ, 1))
= Bg((m, y0), (βg(x, λ), 1)) = Bf ((m, y0), (βg(x, λ), 1))
= Bf((m, y0, m), (βf(x, λ), 1, d)).
Now by casuativity of Bf and d > 0, we obtain
Bf((m, y0), (βf(x, λ), 1)) = m,
which implies y0 = m, a contradiction. Therefore, d = 0, i.e., βg(x, λ) = βf (x, λ). 
5. Convexity induced by admissible functions
For an admissible function f : D → X, a subset S ⊆ D is called f -convex if, for all
n ∈ N, (x, λ) ∈ Sn ×Wn, we have that Bf(x, λ) ∈ S.
Observe that if I ⊂ R is an interval and f = (f1, f2) : I → R
2 satisfies conditions of
Theorem 3.3 then the mean-value property for a Bajraktarević mean can be written as
Bf(x, λ) ∈ J for every subinterval J ⊆ I, n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈ J
n ×Wn. This yields that
every subinterval of I is f -convex. Furthermore, in view of continuity of f , the converse
implication is also valid.
The first assertion characterizes f -convexity in terms of standard convexity.
Proposition 5.1. Let f : D → X be an admissible function. Then S ⊆ D is f -convex if
and only if cone(f(S)) is convex.
Proof. Assume first that S is f -convex. It suffices to show that for every n ∈ N and a
pair (x, λ) ∈ Sn×Wn we have ξ :=
∑n
i=1 λif(xi) ∈ cone(f(S)). But πf(ξ) = f(Bf(x, λ)),
thus ξ ∈ Rf(Bf (x,λ)) ⊆ cone(f(S)).
Conversely, if cone(f(S)) is convex then, as it is positively homogeneous we obtain
r :=
∑n
i=1 λif(xi) ∈ cone(f(S)) for every n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈ S
n ×Wn. By the definition
of projection we obtain πf (r) ∈ f(S) and therefore Bf(x, λ) = f
(−1)(r) = f−1 ◦πf(r) ∈ S,
which shows that S is f -convex. 
Now we show that f -convex sets admit two very important properties of convex sets.
Lemma 5.2. Let f : D → X be an admissible function. Then the class of f -convex
subsets of D is closed with respect to intersection and chain union.
Proof. Let S be an arbitrary family of f -convex subsets of D. Fix n ∈ N, and (x, λ) ∈(⋂
S
)n
×Wn. Then for every S ∈ S we have x ∈ S
n and, in view f -convexity of S, we
also have Bf (x, λ) ∈ S. Therefore Bf(x, λ) ∈
⋂
S which shows that
⋂
S is f -convex.
Now take a chain Q of f -convex sets. Take n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈ (
⋃
Q)n×Wn arbitrarily.
Then, by the chain property of Q, there exists Q ∈ Q such that x ∈ Qn. As Q is f -convex,
we obtain Bf(x, λ) ∈ Q ⊆
⋃
Q. Whence
⋃
Q is f -convex subset of D, too. 
Applying this lemma, for every admissible function f : D → X and S ⊂ D we define
f -convex hull of S as the smallest f -convex subset of D containing S and denote it by
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convf (S). In the next lemma we show that, similarly to the ordinary convex hull, this
definition can be also expressed as a set of all possible combinations of elements in S.
Lemma 5.3. Let f : D → X be an admissible function and S ⊆ D. Then
convf (S) =
{
Bf(x, λ) | (x, λ) ∈W(S)
}
.
Proof. Denote the set on the right-hand-side of the latter equality by T . The inclusion
T ⊆ convf(S) is the obvious implication of f -convexity of the hull. To prove the converse
inclusion, we need to show that T is f -convex.
Let m ∈ N, y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ T
m and ν ∈ Wm be arbitrary. By the definition of
T , in view of reduction priciple and Corollary 4.3 there exists n ∈ N, a vector x ∈ Sn
and Λ = (λ(1), . . . , λ(n)) ∈ Wmn such that yi = Bf(x, λ
(i)) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Now,
Corollary 4.3 implies that there exists µ ∈ Rm+ such that (4.2) holds. In particular for
t :=
(
νi
µi
)m
i=1
∈ Wm, we get
Bf(y, ν) = Bf(y, (t1µ1, . . . , tmµm)) = Bf(x,Λt) ∈ T,
which shows that T is f -convex, indeed. 
We now establish the fundamental relationship between the f -convex hull in D and the
standard convex hull in X.
Proposition 5.4. Let f : D → X be an admissible function and S ⊆ D. Then
(5.1) convf (S) = f
(−1)( conv(f(S))).
Proof. Observe that for every y ∈ convf (S) there exists n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈ S
n×Wn such
that y = Bf(x, λ). Then
y = f (−1)
( n∑
k=1
λkf(xk)
)
∈ f (−1)
(
R+ conv(f(S))
)
= f (−1)
(
conv(f(S))
)
.
Conversely, for every y ∈ f (−1)
(
conv(f(S))
)
there exists n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈ Sn ×Wn
with
∑n
k=1 λk = 1 such that y = f
(−1)(∑n
k=1 λkf(xk)
)
. Then, by the definition of Bf , we
obtain y = Bf(x, λ) ∈ convf(S) which completes the proof. 
6. Equality of generalized Bajraktarević means
Let us now state our main result which characterizes the equality of two generalized
Bajraktarević means. In the one-dimensional case this is a classical result due to Aczél–
Daróczy [2] and Daróczy–Páles [7].
Theorem 6.1. Let X and Y be linear spaces, D be an arbitrary set and f : D → X,
g : D → Y be admissible functions. Then Bf = Bg if and only if g = A◦f for some linear
map A : X → Y .
Unverified alternative proof. Take n ∈ N, a pair (x, λ) ∈ Dn × Wn, and denote briefly
y := Bf(x, λ) ∈ D. By Lemma 3.1, applying A side-by-side in (3.1) and using the
equality g = A ◦ f twice, we get
βf (x, λ)g(y) = A
(
βf(x, λ)f(y)
)
= A
( n∑
k=1
λkf(xk)
)
=
n∑
k=1
λkAf(xk) =
n∑
k=1
λkg(xk).
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Now the converse implication in Lemma 3.1 implies y = Bg(x, λ). As x and λ are arbitrary,
we obtain the equality Bf = Bg.
To prove the converse implication assume that Bf = Bg. Then by Corollary 4.6 we
have βf = βg. We shall use to following claim several times in the proof:
Claim. Let n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈ Dn × Rn . Then
n∑
i=1
λif(xi) = 0 if and only if
n∑
i=1
λig(xi) = 0.
Proof. For λ ≡ 0 the statement is trivial. From now on assume that λ is a nonzero vector
and define
(6.1) λ+ := (max(0, λi))
d
i=1, λ
− := (max(0,−λi))
d
i=1.
Then λ+ and λ− are disjointly supported with nonnegative entries, and λ = λ+ − λ−.
By the first equality we have
n∑
i=1
λ+i f(xi) =
n∑
i=1
λ−i f(xi).
Therefore as λ is nonzero and 0 /∈ conv f(D), we obtain that both λ−, λ+ ∈ Wn. Fur-
thermore by the definition m := Bf(x, λ
−) = Bf (x, λ
+) and µ := βf (x, λ
−) = βf(x, λ
+).
Therefore as Bf = Bg and βf = βg we obtain
n∑
i=1
λig(xi) =
n∑
i=1
λ+i g(xi)−
n∑
i=1
λ−i g(xi)
= βg(x, λ
+)g(Bg(x, λ
+))− βg(x, λ
−)g(Bg(x, λ
−)) = µg(m)− µg(m) = 0.
The second implication is analogous. 
Denote the linear span of f(D) and g(D) by X0 and Y0, respectively. Let Hf ⊆ f(D)
be a Hamel base for X0. Then one can choose a system of elements {xγ | γ ∈ Γ} ⊆ D
such that Hf = {f(xγ) | γ ∈ Γ}.
We are now going to show that Hg := {g(xγ) | γ ∈ Γ} is a Hamel base for Y0.
Indeed, for every collection of pairwise-distinct elements γ1, . . . , γd ∈ Γ, the system
{f(xγ1), . . . , f(xγd)} is linearly independent and thus, by our Claim, so is {g(xγ1), . . . , g(xγd)}.
To show that it is a Hamel base for Y0, we have to prove that Hg is also a generating
system. If not, then there exists an element x∗ ∈ D such that Hg ∪ {g(x
∗)} is linearly
independent. Repeating the same argument (by interchanging the roles of f and g) it
follows thatHf∪{f(x
∗)} is linearly independent, which contradicts thatHf is a generating
system.
As Hf and Hg are Hamel bases for X0 and Y0, respectively, there exists a unique linear
mapping A : X0 → Y0 such that
(6.2) g(x) = Af(x) for all x ∈ DΓ := {xγ | γ ∈ Γ}.
Our aim is to extend the latter equality to all x ∈ D. To this end, take x ∈ D \ DΓ
arbitrarily. Using that Hf is a Hamel base for X0, we can find elements γ1, . . . , γd ∈ Γ
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and nonzero real numbers λ1, . . . , λd such that
f(x) =
d∑
i=1
λif(xγi).
Then
∑d
i=1 λif(xγi) − f(x) = 0, and by our claim
∑d
i=1 λig(xγi) − g(x) = 0. Finally we
obtain
g(x) =
d∑
i=1
λig(xγi) =
d∑
i=1
λiAf(xγi) = A
( d∑
i=1
λif(xγi)
)
= Af(x).
Therefore (6.2) holds for all x ∈ D which completes the proof. 
7. Synergy
Before we introduce the notion of synergy let us present some interpretation of the
aggregated effort. The initial issue of coalitions in decision making theory (and, more
general, theory of cooperation in games) is the problem how to measure the coalition
quality. Intiuitively, synergy is the difference between the aggregated effort and the sum
of the individual efforts, i.e., the arithmetic effort. For the detailed study of synergy, we
refer the reader to [17] and references therein.
Example 7.1. In a toy model we have three parties in a parliament with a total number
of 100 votes and three parties: Party A (λ1 votes), Party B (λ2 votes), Party C (λ3 votes).
Assume that λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ λ3. The are three possible coalitions AB, AC and BC. From the
point of view of the dominant decision system (for example DFDD) each coalition above
50 votes, is equivalent to the same number, the smallest majority which is 51. Thus we
have for all x ∈ D2 and i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with i 6= j,
α(λ) =
{
100
∑n
i=1 λi ≥ 51;∑n
i=1 λi
∑n
i=1 λi ≤ 50.
Now we could compare the sum of weights with the equivalent weight in two cases:
Situation I: (λ1, λ2, λ3) = (45, 35, 20):
sAB = α(λ1, λ2)− (α(λ1) + α(λ2)) = λ3 = 20;
sAC = α(λ1, λ3)− (α(λ1) + α(λ3)) = λ2 = 35;
sBC = α(λ2, λ3)− (α(λ2) + α(λ3)) = λ1 = 45;
sABC = α(λ1, λ2, λ3)− (α(λ1) + α(λ2) + α(λ3)) = 0.
Obviously, each party wants to be in a coalition. However A prefers C than B (as
sAC ≥ sAB) but both B and C prefer to make a coalition with each other (as sBC ≥ sAB
and sBC ≥ sAC). Consequently the coalition BC is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Situation II: (λ1, λ2, λ3) = (55, 30, 15):
sAB = α(λ1, λ2)− (α(λ1) + α(λ2)) = −λ2 = −30;
sAC = α(λ1, λ3)− (α(λ1) + α(λ3)) = −λ1 = −15;
sBC = α(λ2, λ3)− (α(λ2) + α(λ3)) = 0;
sABC = α(λ1, λ2, λ3)− (α(λ1) + α(λ2) + α(λ3)) = 0.
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Then A does not want to make a coalition with either B or C (as the synergy is negative).
Similarly neither B nor C wants to make a coalition with A (this essentially follows from
the real situation). The coalition BC is irrelevant (which refers to the zero synergy).
Obviously, as it was announced, the examples above are instrumental to dominant
decision systems only. For more complicated decision making systems, we need to define
the synergy in a different way. In general, the synergy depends on the players’ decisions.
There are essentially two important assertions:
(1) zero synergy refers to the situation when aggregation is irrelevant to the rest of
the system;
(2) positive synergy should be profitable from the point of view of a decision making
system.
In our model, for an effort function E : W(D) → R+, the E-synergy is a function
σE : W(D)→ R defined as follows
σE(x, λ) := E(x, λ)− (λ1 + · · ·+ λn), n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈ D
n ×Wn.
In other words, σE measures the difference between the given effort and the arithmetic
effort, which is the sum of individual efforts.
If f : D → X is an admissible function and E = βf , then σE will simply be denoted as
σf . Furthermore, in view of Corollary 4.6, we can see that the synergy depends only on
the mean Bf , that is, the equality Bf = Bg implies σf = σg. Therefore, we can define
σBf := σf .
This property has an important interpretation in the theory of coalitional games. The
case when the synergy is negative corresponds to the situation when there appear some
distractions in the cooperation (see Example 7.1.II). The case of positive synergy refers
to the situation when the aggregated effort of the group is greater then sum of efforts of
the individuals (see Example 7.1.I).
Example 7.2. Given a manifold S := {(x, y, z) | x2 + y2 − z2 = −1 ∧ z ≥ 0} ⊆ R3
with a parametrization f : R2 → S given by f(x, y) = (x, y,
√
1 + x2 + y2). Then S is
observable, f is admissible and the Bajraktarević-type mean Bf : W(R
2) → R2 is of the
following form (here and below n ∈ N is fixed, x, y ∈ Rn, and λ ∈ Wn) :
Bf ((x, y), λ) = f
(−1)
( n∑
i=1
λif(xi, yi)
)
= f (−1)
( n∑
i=1
λixi,
n∑
i=1
λiyi,
n∑
i=1
λi
√
1 + x2i + y
2
i
)
.
Now define
∆((x, y), λ) :=
( n∑
i=1
λi
√
1 + x2i + y
2
i
)2
−
( n∑
i=1
λixi
)2
−
( n∑
i=1
λiyi
)2
.
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We can easily verify that
1√
∆((x, y), λ)
( n∑
i=1
λixi,
n∑
i=1
λiyi,
n∑
i=1
λi
√
1 + x2i + y
2
i
)
∈ S,
which yields
Bf ((x, y), λ) =
( 1√
∆((x, y), λ)
n∑
i=1
λixi,
1√
∆((x, y), λ)
n∑
i=1
λiyi
)
;
βf ((x, y), λ) =
√
∆((x, y), λ).
Furthermore the inverse triangle (Minkowski’s) inequality (for ℓ1/2) applied to the vectors
(λ2i ), (λ
2
ix
2
i ), (λ
2
i y
2
i ) implies βf ((x, y), λ) ≥ λ1+ · · ·+λn or, equivalently, σf ((x, y), λ) ≥ 0.
Observe that the above mean is not the standard convex combination of its arguments.
Indeed, for the entries (x, y) = ((1, 0), (0, 1)) and weights λ = (1, 1), we get Bf((x, y), λ) =
(
√
6
6
,
√
6
6
), which obviously does not belong to the segment conv((0, 1), (1, 0)).
7.1. Generalized quasi-arithmetic means. In the next lemma we characterize the
subfamily of zero-synergy generalized Bajraktarević means. Its single variable counterpart
was proved in [15].
Theorem 7.3. Let f : D → X be an admissible function. Then the following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) f(D) is a convex set and
(7.1) Bf (x, λ) = f
−1
(∑n
i=1 λif(xi)∑n
i=1 λi
)
for all n ∈ N and (x, λ) ∈ Dn ×Wn,
in particular the right hand side is well-defined for all such pairs;
(ii) σf ≡ 0;
(iii) Bf is associative, that is,
(7.2) Bf
(
(x, y), (λ, µ)
)
= Bf
((
Bf(x, λ), y
)
, (α(x, λ), µ)
)
for all pairs (x, λ), (y, µ) ∈ W(D) (where α : W(D)→ R+ stands for the arithmetic
effort function);
(iv) Equality (7.2) holds for all (x, λ) ∈W(D) and (y, µ) ∈ D × R+.
Proof. If D is a singleton, then all of the above conditions are satisfied. Therefore, we
may assume that D has at least two distinct elements.
The implications (i) ⇒ (ii), (ii) ⇒ (iii), and (iii) ⇒ (iv) are easy to check. To prove
the implication (iv) ⇒ (i), assume that Bf satisfies (7.2) for all (x, λ) ∈ W(D) and
(y, µ) ∈ D × R+.
Fix n ∈ N and a pair (x, λ) ∈ Dn×Wn. We denote briefly x¯ := Bf(x, λ), λ¯ := βf (x, λ)
and α¯ := α(x, λ). Then we have that
∑n
i=1 λif(xi) = λ¯f(x¯).
Now fix y ∈ D \ {x¯} and µ > 0. Applying the delegativity of Bf and condition (iv), we
have
Bf
(
(x¯, y), (λ¯, µ)
)
= Bf
(
(x, y), (λ, µ)
)
= Bf
(
(x¯, y), (α¯, µ)
)
.
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Consequently λ¯f(x¯) + µf(y) and α¯f(x¯) + µf(y) are on the same ray, i.e., there exists a
constant C > 0 such that
C ·
(
λ¯f(x¯) + µf(y)
)
= α¯f(x¯) + µf(y),
which reduces to
0 = (Cλ¯− α¯)f(x¯) + µ(C − 1)f(y).
As y 6= x¯, the admissibility implies that f(y) and f(x¯) are linearly independent. Conse-
quently, the above equality implies C = 1 and λ¯ = α¯. Thus,∑n
i=1 λif(xi)∑n
i=1 λi
=
∑n
i=1 λif(xi)
α¯
=
∑n
i=1 λif(xi)
λ¯
= f(x¯) ∈ f(D),
which implies that f(D) is a convex set. Finally, applying f−1 side-by-side we get that
(7.1) holds. 
7.2. Gini means. We are now going to calculate the sign of the synergy for Gini means.
Before we go into the details, we recall a few properties of this family. First, it is easy
to observe that Gp,q = Gq,p for all p, q ∈ R. Furthermore, in a case q = 0, the Gini
mean Gp,0 equals the p-th Power mean (in particular it is associative). These means are
monotone with respect to their parameters, more precisely, for all p, q, r, s ∈ R, we have
that Gp,q ≤ Gr,s if and only if min(p, q) ≤ min(r, s) and max(p, q) ≤ max(r, s) (cf. [6]).
Finally, a Gini mean Gp,q is monotone as a mean (in each of its argument) if and only if
pq ≤ 0 (see [13, 14]). We show that the sign of pq is also important in characterizing the
sign of their synergy.
Proposition 7.4. Sign of the synergy of the Gini mean Gp,q coincides with that of −pq.
More precisely, for all p, q ∈ R, n ∈ N, nonconstant vector x ∈ Rn+ and λ ∈ R
n
+, we have
sign
(
σGp,q(x, λ)
)
= − sign(pq).
Proof. If pq = 0, then Gp,q is associative and thus Lemma 7.3 implies σGp,q ≡ 0. From now
on assume that pq 6= 0. Fix n ∈ N, λ ∈ Rn+ and nonconstant vector x ∈ R
n
+. Let
ϕp := λ1x
p
1 + · · ·+ λnx
p
n and ψp := λ1x
p
1 ln(x1) + · · ·+ λnx
p
n ln(xn) (p ∈ R).
Assume first that p 6= q. As γp,q = γq,p, without loss of generality, we can assume that
p > q. Then by (3.4), we have
γp,q(x, λ) =
(λ1x
q
1 + · · ·+ λnx
q
n)
p
p−q
(λ1x
p
1 + · · ·+ λnx
p
n)
q
p−q
=
(
ϕpq
ϕqp
) 1
p−q
.
Whence by the definition
σGp,q(x, λ) = γp,q(x, λ)− (λ1 + · · ·+ λn) =
(
ϕpq
ϕqp
) 1
p−q
− ϕ0.
In view of the inequality p > q, we obtain
σGp,q(x, λ) > 0 ⇐⇒
(
ϕpq
ϕqp
) 1
p−q
> ϕ0 ⇐⇒ ϕ
p
q > ϕ
p−q
0 ϕ
q
p ⇐⇒
(
ϕq
ϕ0
)p
>
(
ϕp
ϕ0
)q
.
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For pq < 0 we obtain that σGp,q(x, λ) > 0 is equivalent to
(ϕq
ϕ0
)1/q
<
(ϕp
ϕ0
)1/p
. But the
last inequality is just the equality between power means. Thus we have σGp,q(x, λ) > 0
whenever pq < 0.
If pq > 0 then σGp,q(x, λ) > 0 is equivalent to
(ϕq
ϕ0
)1/q
>
(ϕp
ϕ0
)1/p
. But, as p > q we know
that the converse inequality holds. So in this case we obtain σGp,q(x, λ) < 0.
In the last case, when p = q 6= 0, we have
σGp,p(x, λ) = γp,p(x, λ)− (λ1 + · · ·+ λn) = ϕp exp
(−pψp
ϕp
)
− ϕ0.
Therefore
σGp,p(x, λ) < 0 ⇐⇒ ϕp exp
(−pψp
ϕp
)
− ϕ0 < 0 ⇐⇒ exp
(−pψp
ϕp
)
<
ϕ0
ϕp
.
We can apply the strictly decreasing mapping R+ ∋ ξ 7→ sign(p)ξ
−1/p side-by-side to
obtain
σGp,p(x, λ) < 0 ⇐⇒ sign(p) exp
(ψp
ϕp
)
> sign(p)
(ϕp
ϕ0
)1/p
⇐⇒ sign(p)Gp,p(x, λ) > sign(p)Gp,0(x, λ).
But the inequality on the right-hand-side holds for all p ∈ R \ {0}, which completes the
proof. 
Remark. Observe that Gini mean has a positive synergy if the graph of γp,q is hyperbolic
and negative for parabolic graphs. In the case of hyperboloid in Example 7.2 the synergy
was also positive.
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